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Many authors argue that we suffer from a lack of ability to treat small risks; we either ignore them completely
or give them too much emphasis. An example often referred to is terrorism risk, the reference being the
number of fatalities observed due to terror compared to for example deaths in trafﬁc accidents. The thesis is
that the risk is over-estimated. However, these assertions, that the risks are over-estimated and we give them
too much emphasis – they are treated out of proportion to their importance – cannot be justiﬁed in any
scientiﬁcally meaningful way when there are large uncertainties about the consequences of the activity
considered. Over-estimation is a value judgment, as is the phrase “far too much emphasis”. In the paper the
author argues that the statements represent some serious misconceptions about risk. The purpose of the
present paper is to point to these misconceptions and provide some guidance on how they can be rectiﬁed.
& 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
1. Introduction
The point of departure for this paper is the book, Thinking Fast and
Slow, of Daniel Kahneman [15], for sure one of the most inﬂuential
researchers on risk and decision analysis in the last 30–40 years. The
response to this book has been overwhelming, with words like
‘brilliance’ and ‘masterpiece’ frequently used to describe it.
The book is based on a dichotomy between two modes of
thought: System 1 which operates automatically and quickly, instinc-
tive and emotional, and System 2 which is slower, more logical, and
deliberative. The book identiﬁes cognitive biases associated with
each type of thinking, using several decades of academic research on
the issue, to large extent linked to Kahneman's own research.
The book also relates to risk. Kahneman asserts that we have a
basic lack of ability to treat small risks: we either ignore them
completely or give them too much weight. The main thesis put
forward is that we over-estimate small risks [15, p. 324].
Kahneman is not alone in thinking along these lines. The
literature is ﬁlled with contributions where the same type of
reasoning prevails. Authors lampoon the way society deals with
security issues – the terrorist risks are over-estimated; very small
risks are treated out of proportion to their importance.
The purpose of the present paper is to point to these views and
to argue that they represent some serious misconceptions and
consequently need to be refuted. They are serious, as they could
have a great effect on the way we manage risk, whether it relates
to security, technology and engineering, environmental impacts
and natural disasters, health, or ﬁnancial risk management. All
areas are concerned with managing small risks.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Firstly, in
Section 2, more details about the above theses are provided and it
is pointed to the problems of their use in light of common ways of
looking at risk and probability. It is not possible to provide a
meaningful discussion of this issue without being precise on what
these terms – risk and probability, and over-estimation – mean.
Then, in Section 3, some perspectives on how we should in fact
think regarding small risks and large uncertainties are presented
and discussed. The key is to acknowledge that when it comes to
risk, uncertainty is a main factor and there is no way of measuring,
at the point of decision, what is over-estimation of risk. Finally,
Section 4 provides some conclusions.
2. The misconceptions
Kahneman [15] provides many examples to illustrate his
message. One is related to suicide bombings in buses in Israel in
the period 2001–2004:
I visited Israel several times during a period in which suicide
bombing in buses were relatively common - though of course
quite rare in absolute terms. There were 23 bombings between
December 2004, which had caused a total of 236 fatalities. The
number of daily bus raiders in Israel was approximately 1.3million
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at that time. For any travelers, the risks were tiny, but that was
not how the public felt about it. People avoided buses as much as
they could, and many travelers spent their time on the bus
anxiously scanning their neighbors for packages or bulky clothes
that might hide a bomb.
I did not have much occasion to travel on buses, as I was driving a
rented car, but I was chagrined to discover that my behavior was
also affected. I found that I did not like to stop next to a bus at a
red light and I drove away more quickly than usual when the light
changed. I was ashamed of myself, because of course I knew
better. I knew that the risk was truly negligible, and that any
effect at all on my actions would assign an inordinately high
“decision weight” to a minuscule probability. In fact, I was more
likely to be injured in a driving accident than by stopping near a
bus. But my avoidance of buses was not motivated by a rational
concern for survival. What drove me was the experience of the
moment: being next to a bus made me think of bombs, and these
thoughts were unpleasant. I was avoiding buses because I wanted
to think of something else [15, pp. 322–323].
One view on this example by Kahneman is as follows – to be
further substantiated and discussed in the coming Section 3:
However, the individual risk is not determined by hindsight,
observing historical fatality rates. At a speciﬁc point in time, an
objective risk metric for this person does not exist. The statement by
Kahneman that the individual risk is minimal lacks a rationale, as risk
relates to the future and the future is not known. Thus the associated
behavior cannot be said to be irrational (in a wide sense of the word),
as there is no way to determine the truth about risk at the decision
point. We can make the same considerations concerning probability.
Kahneman seems to link probability to historical observations, not to
the future and to judgments about the future. He refers frequently to
the “exact probability level” – for example he writes on page 323: “…
The emotion is not only disproportionate to the probability, it is also
insensitive to the exact level of probability.” However, there exists no
objective probability that can be used as a basis for a proper decision
weight. His thinking fails to take into account the uncertainty
dimension. He refers to risk and probability as being objective
quantities for which rational comparisons can be made. Such
concepts do not exist in the example addressed here or in most
other real-life situations. Note that the critique here relates to what
Kahneman writes about risk and probability in this particular case,
not his work in general.
Kahneman goes on with another example, linked to Lotto. He
points to a similarity: buying a lotto ticket gives an immediate
reward of pleasant fantasies, as avoiding the bus immediately is
rewarded by relief of fear. According to Kahneman, the actual
probability is inconsequential for both cases; it is only the possibility
that matters [15, p. 323]. However, the two situations are not
comparable; in the latter case there exists an objective probability
that we can relate to, but not in the former case. It is this lack of
objective reference values that makes risk so difﬁcult to measure and
handle. Kahneman and his school of thought have for decades
conducted research that shows that people (and in particular
laypersons), are poor assessors of probability if the reference is an
objective, true probability, and that probability assignments are
inﬂuenced by a number of factors [24]. It has been shown that
people use rather primitive cognitive techniques when assessing
probabilities; these are heuristics, which are easy and intuitive ways
for specifying probabilities in uncertain situations. The result of using
such heuristics is often that the assessor unconsciously tends to put
too much weight on insigniﬁcant factors. The most common heur-
istics are the availability heuristic, the anchoring and adjusting
heuristics, and the representativeness heuristic.
If it is not possible to relate the probability assignment to a true
value, how can we then speak about biases and poor assessments?
For an individual taking the bus in the above example, the research
framework of Kahneman and others may be questioned as the event
is a unique event for this person. Of course, he or she may beneﬁt
from the general insights provided by the research of biases and
heuristics, for example the availability heuristic, which means that
the assessor tends to base his probability assignment on the ease
with which similar events can be retrieved from memory; events
where the assessor can easily retrieve similar events from memory
are likely to be given higher probabilities of occurrence than events
that are less vivid and/or completely unknown to the expert. There
exists, however, no reference for making a judgment that this
heuristic leads to a bias. Care has to be shown when applying the
results from the research framework of Kahneman and others into
unique events. It can lead to what the author of the present paper
considers to be unjustiﬁed conclusions, as in the above example
where the “true” probability of being killed in a bus bombing was
said to be negligible. The discussion in the coming section will give
further arguments for this view.
The above discussion has the recent book by Kahneman as a
point of departure, but the literature and media are ﬁlled with
examples where this type of ideas prevails. As an example from
the public discourse, let us go back to a newspaper article in
Norway from 2009 [20], which refers to a book by the philosopher
Joakim Hammerlin [13]. The topic is again terrorism risk, but now
we have a focus on the authority perspective.
The message from these authors is that the terrorist risk is
ﬁctional. It is argued that there is a greater risk of drowning than
being hit by terror. They point to research showing that there is no
scientiﬁc basis for claiming that the security controls at airports
make it safer to ﬂy, and that the statistical probability of dying in a
terrorist attack in the West is 0.0000063; after 11 September 2001
more people have drowned in the bathroom in the U.S. than are
killed in terrorist attacks. Terror is not something to fear, says
Hammerlin, as the risk is microscopic. The population is frightened
by a ﬁctitious danger and risk. Is it any wonder that the authors
are upset and lampoon the authorities?
Again the reference seems to be some underlying true risk which
is provided by the observed historical numbers. The authors take a
blinkered view of what has happened. But there is a big leap from
history to the future. And it is the future that we are concerned
about. What will happen tomorrow, what form will an attack take,
and what will be the consequences? We do not know. There is
uncertainty associated with these events and their consequences.
Numbers expressing the risk can be given, but they will always
be dependent on the available knowledge and the assumptions
made. The historical data referred to by Hammerlin say something
about the risk, but the most important aspect of risk is not
addressed, namely uncertainty; we do not know what is next.
We hope that the security measures implemented can prevent a
terrorist attack, but they are also motivated by a need to reduce
uncertainty and make people feel more secure. However, if the
underlying perspective is that the risk is objectively described by a
risk number, such arguments will be of little interest.
This discussion may at a ﬁrst glance seem to be closely linked to
the distinction between Kahneman's two Systems, 1 and 2,
mentioned in Section 1. However, the main point made in the
present paper is not to give increased weight to the System 1 when
assessing risk – the importance of highlighting the uncertainties
can be solely based on the System 2 thinking. The logical and
deliberative features characterizing System 2 can be the basis also
for the uncertainty assessment highlighted here although there
are more methodological challenges when we have to see beyond
the traditional historical data case, as will be clear from the
following discussion.
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3. The rectiﬁcation
The purpose of this section is to meet the challenges – what
the author of the present paper will refer to as misconceptions –
described in the previous section by providing a proper conceptual
framework for understanding the situations discussed in Section 2.
Firstly, some general features of the concepts of probability and
risk are addressed. Then we speciﬁcally look into the two cases
considered in the previous section. Finally, a general discussion is
provided.
3.1. The concepts of probability and risk
The meaning of a probability in a risk context has been
thoroughly discussed in the literature (e.g. [1,25,21,22,19,4]) There
is no disagreement among experts on how to interpret classical
and frequentist probabilities. If we have situations, as in gambling,
where there are a ﬁnite number of outcomes and these are equally
likely, the (classical) probability for a speciﬁc outcome is 1/n,
where n is the number of possible outcomes. If we have a situation
which can be repeated inﬁnitely, under similar conditions, the
limiting fraction of “successes” gives the frequentist probability.
This latter probability is often associated with the propensity
interpretation of a probability. It holds that probability should be
thought of as a physical characteristic, a predisposition of a
repeatable experimental set-up which produces outcomes with
limiting relative frequency. When the set-up is deﬁned, all these
probabilities can be viewed as objective – they exist independently
of speciﬁc knowledge held by individuals.
Many people tacitly presume the existence of a type of
objective probability, such as a propensity interpreted probability.
The scientiﬁc nomenclature and reasoning are based on such a
concept and it leads to judgments about the probability being
over-estimated or under-estimated, in the sense that the estimate
of these probabilities is higher or lower than the true underlying
probabilities. As these true underlying probabilities are unknown,
we should add a statement about being conﬁdent that the
estimates are higher or lower than these values. Over-estimation
(under-estimation) can also be interpreted without referring to a
true value: we speak of over-estimation (under-estimation) if the
estimation produces higher (lower) values than can be justiﬁed by
some deﬁned standards. We refer to these two interpretations of
over(under)-estimation as type I and type II, respectively.
However, the applicability of this type of objective probabilities is
limited. When can such a set-up be established? For gambling
situations and experimental situations, yes, but not for many cases
where risk is an issue. Think about the two situations considered in
the previous section – frequentist type of probabilities do not exist in
these cases, they cannot be meaningfully deﬁned. The situations are
unique. Among all common categories of probability, the only type
that the author of this paper can see justiﬁed in these cases is
subjective (judgmental, knowledge-based) probabilities, a type of
probability which expresses the assessor's degree of belief that the
relevant event will occur. This probability is, as its name indicates,
subjective. There is no reference value that can be used to say that a
subjective probability is over-estimated or under-estimated at the
time of assignment when speaking about interpretation I of this
term. With hindsight we can check how the assessor performs
compared to observations and we can discuss his or her ability to
make accurate predictions, for example by comparing his/her hit rate
with his/her assigned probability. However, for unique events, as we
addressed in the previous section, this is of course not possible. No
one can claim that a person's subjective probability is wrong. If a
person states that his/her subjective probability for a speciﬁc event to
occur is 10%, it means that he/she ﬁnds the uncertainty and his/her
degree of belief to be the same as drawing a speciﬁc ball out of an
urn comprising 10 balls under the standard experimental set-up
[18,16,23]. When Kahneman and his colleagues speak about sub-
jective probabilities, they refer to betting and a decision making
context, in line with de Finetti and others, who interpret a subjective
probability of 10% to be the maximum price one is willing to pay to
play a gamble which gives one unit of money if the event considered
occurs and zero otherwise. More precisely, if you assign the sub-
jective probability P(A)¼0.1 you are expressing that you are indif-
ferent between receiving (paying) €10 or taking a gamble in which
you receive (pay) €100 if A occurs and €0 if A does not occur [4].
The above points made for the urn type of interpretation are
also applicable for the betting interpretation: a subjective prob-
ability is the only one that is meaningful in unique cases such as
those studied in this paper; it cannot be subject to over or under-
estimation at the point of assignment, when speaking about
interpretation I of this term.
Now let us consider interpretation II of the term over(under)-
estimation: the estimation produces higher (lower) values than
can be justiﬁed by some deﬁned standards. The issue is linked to
the fundamental understanding of a subjective probability, and its
link to so-called evidence-based and logic probabilities as will be
discussed in the following.
Many authors have argued against the use of the term “sub-
jective” in relation to the subjective Bayesian meaning of prob-
ability, for example Kaplan [16,17]. The problem raised is that the
probability is linked to terms like “beliefs” and “conﬁdence” which
are subjective. But, according to Kaplan and others (for example
[12]), a true Bayesian uses probability in sense of degree of
credibility or conﬁdence dictated by the evidence, through Bayes'
theorem – there is no personality in it, no “opinion”. Kaplan [17]
refers to Jaynes [14]:
Probability theory is an extension of logic, which describes the
inductive reasoning of an idealized being who represents degrees
of plausibility by real numbers. The numerical value of any
probability (A/B) will in general depend not only on A and B,
but also on the entire background of other propositions that this
being is taking into account. A probability assignment is “sub-
jective” in the sense that it describes a state of knowledge rather
than any property of the “real” world; but is completely “objec-
tive” in the sense that it is independent of the personality of the
user; two beings faced with the same total background of
knowledge must assign the same probabilities. -E.T. Jaynes
Following this type of reasoning, it is more natural to refer to the
probability as an “evidence-based” probability than subjective prob-
ability [17]. The argumentation leads us to logical probabilities as was
ﬁrst proposed by Keynes (1921): there is a number in the interval
[0,1], denoted P(H|E), which measures the objective degree of logical
support that the evidence E gives to the hypothesis H [11]. However,
the rational of these types of probabilities can be questioned, and
several scholars have argued that interpretations of this type cannot
be justiﬁed [9,8,4]. Using such probabilities it is not clear how we
should interpret a number (say) 0.2 compared to 0.3.
Hence we are back to the subjective probability interpretations
given above using for example an urn as a reference for comparing
the uncertainty, degree of belief or conﬁdence. The assigned
probability expresses the assigner's uncertainty (degree of belief,
conﬁdence) given his/her background knowledge, and we have to
acknowledge that if two persons have the same background
knowledge they would not necessarily have the same probability
[19, p. 44]. Lindley writes:
Some people have put forward the argument that the only
reason two persons differ in their beliefs about an event is that
they have different knowledge bases, and that if these bases
were shared, the two people would have the same beliefs, and
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therefore the same probability. This would remove the personal
element from probability and it would logically follow that
with knowledge base K for an uncertain event E, all would have
the same uncertainty, and therefore the same probability P(E|
K), called a logical probability. We do not share this view, partly
because it is very difﬁcult to say what is meant by two
knowledge bases being the same. In particular it has proved
impossible to say what is meant by being ignorant of an event,
or having an empty knowledge base, and although special cases
can be covered, the general concept of ignorance has not
yielded to analysis [19, p. 44].
Acknowledging the subjective elements of this type of prob-
abilities, it is essential to distinguish what is the evidence – the
knowledge basis – and what is the assignment based on it. The
probabilistic analysis then becomes more a tool for argument,
rather than an objective representation of the truth [25].
We may be uncertain about an event occurring or not, or a
quantity (for example the number of fatalities next year due to
terrorist attacks), and to measure or express the uncertainty, we
use the tool (subjective) probability. It is important to make a
distinction between this uncertainty, and the measurement of it,
as there are different ways of representing or expressing this
uncertainty (although probability is the most common, see below).
We see that the concept of over(under)-estimation by making
judgments of the estimation producing higher (lower) values than
can be justiﬁed by some deﬁned standards, is also problematic. What
are these standards? In general and in particular in cases as discussed
here characterized with large uncertainties, it seems impossible to
obtain in some objective way what should be the standard used for
such comparisons. In theory one could think of a reference prob-
ability obtained by removing all biases as described by the various
heuristic (availability, anchoring etc.), but also these heuristics are
founded on some references or standards for what is adequate
reasoning. The fundamental problem of having an objective standard
is thus not solved. We could of course also think about over(under)-
estimation in relation to a subjective standard – for example the
assigner's “best judgments”, but that would not provide a basis for
arguments about the true or real probability and risk, as have been
the point of departure for the analysis in this paper.
Now a few words about the risk concept. Given the above
considerations about probability, we are led to the conclusion that
if the risk and probability concepts are to be used for situations such
as those studied in Section 2, i.e. unique events, probability must be
understood as a subjective probability. However, a risk concept based
on such probabilities would only to some extent be able to reﬂect the
phenomena and aspects that we would like this concept to reﬂect.
Think of two situations: one where the assessor assigns a probability
of an event to be 0.1 and the knowledge base is very strong, and one
where the assessor assigns the same number but the knowledge base
is weak. Should not the level of risk then be different?
Adopting the urn type of interpretation of a subjective prob-
ability, the answer is obviously ‘yes’, as the probability represents a
pure uncertainty assessment completely isolated from the related
decision problems: in the airport case, whether or not to imple-
ment some speciﬁc security measures for passengers to board the
planes. If some analysts assign a probability of an attack occurring
to be 0.1, it is essential for the decision maker to know whether the
background knowledge supporting this number is strong or weak.
For this reason many researchers and risk analysts prefer to use
other approaches for representing the epistemic uncertainties, includ-
ing those based on interval probability, possibility theory and evidence
theory, as well as qualitative methods reﬂecting the strength of the
background knowledge K [10]. For the sake of simplicity these
alternative approaches are referred to as non-probabilistic methods.
Hence, to allow for these non-probabilistic methods, we have to leave
the probability-based risk concepts. The natural extension is to
consider perspectives on risk that are based on uncertainty in place
of probability, as both the probabilistic and the non-probabilistic
methods are ways of representing the uncertainties.
The perspective on risk seeing it as a combination of events/
scenarios, consequences and likelihood/probability (for example
[18]), limits itself to one representation of uncertainty – namely
probability, but risk can be viewed to exist as explained above
without linking it to one speciﬁc measurement tool. (Kaplan and
Garrick [18] could also be interpreted along these lines when
referring to risk as “damageþuncertainties”.) When describing
and measuring the risk we have to choose a suitable tool, being it
probability or an alternative as mentioned above.
The above reasoning, leading to a risk concept based on uncer-
tainty in place of probability, would also apply if the betting type of
interpretation is used. However, the situation is somewhat more
complex, given that if the event (the attack for example) occurs, you
will get €10. But as noted by Lindley [19], see also Cooke [7],
receiving the payment would be trivial if the accident were to occur
(the assessor might not be alive to receive it). The problem is that
there is a link between the probability assignment and value
judgments concerning the price of the gamble, the money. How
important is the €10 to you? This value judgment has nothing to do
with the uncertainties per se, or your degree of belief in the event A
occurring. We see that the interpretation is based on a mixture of
uncertainty assessments and value judgments. This is why the author
of the present paper cannot recommend the use of this interpreta-
tion of a subjective probability [4].
The above argumentation leads to a general risk framework
based on the following ideas [3]: We study an activity in the
future, for example taking buses in Israel in a speciﬁc period of
time, (undesirable) events A may occur, giving some consequences
C. At this point in time we do not know whether A will occur or
not, and what C will be; these quantities are unknown – uncertain
(U). This is risk – for short we write Risk¼(A,C,U), or just (C,U),
where C covers all consequences of the activity, including the
events. This deﬁnes the concept of risk, and to describe risk we
need to specify the consequences (C0) and use a measure (in a wide
sense) of the uncertainties (Q), resulting in a risk description (C0, Q,
K), where K is the background knowledge that C0 and Q are based
on. If we speciﬁcally focus on the events A, the risk description
becomes (A0,C0,Q,K), where A0 are the events speciﬁed in the risk
assessment. Note that C is the actual consequences and C0 are the
consequences speciﬁed in the assessment. The most common
measure of uncertainty is probability P, so that Q¼P, but alter-
natives exist as mentioned above. To be more concrete, let us
consider the two cases introduced in Section 2.
3.2. Bus bombing example
Let us return to the suicide bombings in buses in Israel in the
period 2001–2004. A person, say John, is considering taking the bus.
He faces risk. The bus could be subject to a suicide bombing (A)
having serious consequences (C) – most likely death. At the decision
point, John does not know if the event A will occur for this particular
bus trip, but he is quite sure about the consequences given a bomb.
Before he makes a decision about taking the bus or not, he considers
risk; he makes a crude risk assessment, focusing on A0: the
occurrence of a suicide bombing event on this particular trip, and
C0: level of injuries and/or loss of life. John thinks the bombing will be
fatal so the key issue is the probability of the bombing event
occurring and the strength of knowledge. For a moment we just
assume that other aspects, like fear, can be ignored. John tries to
make a fair and balanced risk assessment.
Let us assume that John is well informed about the bombings that
have occurred up to this point. However, this information does not of
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course give him reliable estimates of the frequency of bombing
events for the future including his bus trip. What is coming next is
subject to uncertainty. The attackers could change policy, and the
form and intensity of attacks could increase (decrease) at any time.
He does not know. John's subjective probability P could be relatively
low, but he has to acknowledge that it is heavily dependent on the
assumptions made concerning the attackers. Alternatively, he could
think through imprecision intervals, as he is not willing to make a
speciﬁc probability assignment. Also, to be meaningful, such an
interval needs to be based on some assumptions, but less than for
the speciﬁc probability assignment. In both cases, the risk assessment
covers judgments about the combination (P,K), and it is for sure not a
straightforward conclusion that the risk is negligible, as Kahneman
argued. Rather, the author of the present paper believes that most
people would ﬁnd the risk (P,K), based on common-sense thinking,
to be rather high, having in mind that the bombing would most likely
be fatal. Talking about over-estimation of risk is problematic, as there
is no obvious standard to use as a reference.
Hence, John is likely to avoid taking the bus at this stage. In face of
the risk – characterized by large uncertainties – one tries to avoid it,
one is cautious (i.e. applies the cautionary principle [6]). This
assessment is based on the assumption that John is able to perform
a professional risk assessment, where fear and other types of feelings
are not incorporated in the judgments. He is aware of the different
types of heuristics, in particular the availability heuristic in this case,
so his probability or interval probability (interpreted with reference
to the urn standard) expresses his degree of belief given his knowl-
edge. Clearly this knowledge is and should be strongly affected by the
events that have happened recently, but it does not necessarily lead
to these events being emphasized “too much”. They could be given
“too much” focus if the assessor is a layman, who is inﬂuenced by the
extremity of the situation and the consequences, with all the terrible
details, but then the professional risk assessment has become a risk
perception, where the risk judgment is affected by personal feelings
like fear. A layman's risk perception captures his/her (P,K) but also
feelings about the situation, the events and consequences, and we
know that these feelings could be very decisive for the overall
judgment about the risk and the related risk management. In this
case, the feeling attributes would for most people lead to an even
further cautionary attitude and avoidance of the buses. It is an
extreme cautious policy which needs to be balanced, of course, with
the need for the person to take the bus. The probabilities that
Kahneman refers to in his argumentation, that should make them
behave just as if nothing has happened, are based on the historical
data and are informing John, but do not capture the uncertainty
aspect of the risk and is therefore of limited value for guiding John in
his decision making.
3.3. Airport terrorist attack example
The airport example is different than the bus bombing exam-
ples, as we take the perspective of the authorities: What measure
should we implement to handle the risk related to potential
attackers? The situation can then be characterized as follows:
An attack A can occur, somewhere, at any time in the coming
years. The consequences C could have different degrees of severity
depending on the type of attack and how it is met, how barriers
work etc. We do not know if such attacks will occur and what the
consequences will be. A risk assessment would need to address the
type of attacks that could occur, their consequences, and the
uncertainties. Probabilities and interval probabilities can be
assigned, but, as in the previous example, they would not be so
critical for the decisions that need to be made. The key aspect is the
uncertainties, not the probabilities. The authorities know that an
attack can occur, it has happened before and it could happen in the
future. The probability cannot be ignored. The historical number of
attacks and lost lives due to such events do not provide much
information about what could happen in the future. The risk
description, capturing a non-negligible probability of an attack,
extreme consequence potentials, and the knowledge about poten-
tial attackers and their motivation and capacities, would obviously
lead the authorities to conclude that the risk is so high that strong
measures need to be taken to manage the risk. For the air industry,
which is so important for our society, high safety/security standards
and people's trust are essential. We can all be annoyed by the
detailed controls at our airports, but the policies implemented after
the September 11 events, are difﬁcult to argue against. People are
still traveling by plane and we have had no “successful attack” since
September 11. In that respect, the cautious policy has worked. The
costs have been extremely high but there has been broad political
agreement all over the world that the cautionary measures have
been required to regain trust and avoid new disasters like those of
September 11.
3.4. Discussion
Kahneman was chagrined that he did not like to stop next to a
bus at a red light, as he knew that the risk was negligible. It is the
view of the present author that he should not be chagrined. His
reaction when being close to the bus was natural given the
uncertainties, probabilities and risks; they were not necessarily
negligible for him, when allowing risk to also reﬂect the uncer-
tainties. As the above analysis demonstrates, there is no truth
about the bomb probability or the risk, and hence the term ‘over-
estimation’ is problematic – there is no objective reference or
standard for their comparison.
A decision to not take a bus if there is an alternative, would
probably also be supported by an expected utility analysis, as any
assigned probability for a bomb would give weight to an event
that is highly undesirable. However, this theory is not very
relevant in supporting the decision making in this particular case.
Specifying the probabilities and the utilities is difﬁcult and would
lead to a number exercise that tries to replace difﬁcult value
judgments by mathematical formulas. What people would do is to
assess and perceive risk, compare these with the beneﬁts/costs of
the various alternatives, and make a decision. No formal procedure
is needed, beyond this. We are all used to this, and it works.
The key challenge is the uncertainties; we do not know what is
coming next. Risk assessment cannot eliminate all these uncertain-
ties and provide an optimal decision for you. The issue is a question
of how much weight we are to give to the uncertainties. In situation
like those described in Section 2, people may be frightened and lean
heavily on cautionary thinking. Of course, it is possible to become too
cautious, the uncertainties make one passive, afraid that the activity
will lead to a negative outcome. Life is about balancing different
concerns and aspects, including beneﬁts and risks/uncertainties, and
we all agree that being too cautious is not the recipe for a good life.
However, taking unnecessary risks, like traveling frequently on the
bus in this period if alternatives are possible, could be seen as playing
Russian roulette – it should not be undertaken unless it is extremely
important for you to play this game (take the bus).
Much of the above discussion also applies to the airport security
example. Here the decision making is an organizational one, and not
individual, but the need for balancing different concerns and aspects
is the same. The authorities assess the risk and uncertainties, the
consequences of attack situations, as well as the effect of the control
measures, and make a decision. The conclusion of implementing the
extensive cautionary measures after September 11 may at a ﬁrst
glance seem unnecessary, but a further reﬂection shows that the
authorities had no choice. If a new terrorist event had occurred,
having disastrous consequences, the authorities would for sure have
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been massively criticized if sufﬁciently strong preventive measures
had not been implemented.
To make a decision on for example taking the bus or not, the risk
judgments are informing us, not prescribing what to do. This is the
risk assessment contribution in general – informing the decision-
maker [2]. When people make decisions under risk/uncertainty there
are many attributes that inﬂuence the decision; the risk assessment
results is just one of them [23]. And for the decision-maker to make a
decision the risks and uncertainties need not be expressed using
probability or other quantitative tools. Only if a risk-based approach
is sought, where a direct link is established between the risk
assessment results and the decision, the risk/uncertainty must be
explicitly expressed. However, as argued for in this paper and for
example by Slovic [23], Apostolakis [2] and Aven [5], such a risk-
based approach cannot be justiﬁed as risk is more than a quantiﬁed
measure of uncertainty and there are other concerns than risk that
determine what is the right decision.
4. Conclusions
The thesis that small risks in many practical situations are over-
estimated (and hence are inadequately dealt with – are treated out of
proportion to their importance), is common among scientists and in
the public discourse about risk. This paper has argued that it cannot
in general be justiﬁed. In the paper two real-life examples have been
presented, demonstrating the invalidity of the thesis. The key is that
when there are large uncertainties about the consequences of the
activity considered, there is no reference for making judgments
about under- or over-estimation of risk. The above thesis is com-
monly built on an idea of risk (and probability) as an objective
quantity that exists independent of the assessor, reﬂecting the true
states of the activity, determined on the basis of observations.
However, both the objectivity and the belief in an ability to perform
accurate estimation using historical data represent serious miscon-
ceptions: There is no objective way of measuring the level of
probability and risk that a speciﬁc person will be a victim of a
terrorist attack tomorrow. The situation is unique with no stable
repeatable process justifying a probability model reﬂecting variation
of similar units, as the objectivity would require. What characterizes
the situation is not true probabilities but uncertainty. Faced with
uncertainties, we are in a situation that needs value judgments
balancing different concerns and aspects, the risk (including the
uncertainties) and the beneﬁts of the activity.
To understand and guide the decision making in situations of
risk, a proper risk perspective is needed. In the paper we show
how such a perspective can be formulated meeting the challenges
raised by the examples here discussed. The key is that probability
is replaced by uncertainty. Following this perspective the impor-
tance of uncertainty in understanding risk and the consecutive
decision making, is highlighted. The balancing act of risk
management also means giving weight to the cautionary principle,
which states that, in the case of uncertainties, measures are
needed to reduce risk and uncertainties, or even to avoid the
activity. It is a principle in line with how people behave, and it is
completely rational (in a wide sense of the word).
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